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Abstract 
Atheists are often portrayed in the media and elsewhere as angry individuals.  Although atheists 
disagree with the pillar of many religions, namely the existence of a God, it may not necessarily 
be the case that they are angry individuals.  The prevalence and accuracy of angry-atheist 
perceptions were examined in 7 studies with 1,677 participants from multiple institutions and 
locations in the U.S.  Studies 1-3 revealed that people believe atheists are angrier than believers, 
people in general, and other minority groups, both explicitly and implicitly.  Studies 4-7 then 
examined the accuracy of these beliefs.  Belief in God, state anger, and trait anger were assessed 
in multiple ways and contexts.  None of these studies supported the idea that atheists are 
particularly angry individuals.  Rather, these results support the idea that people believe atheists 
are angry individuals, but they do not appear to be angrier than other individuals in reality.   
Keywords: anger, atheism, atheist, belief in God, personality, stereotypes 
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The Myth of the Angry Atheist 
 Most people in the U.S. believe in God.  A 2008 survey of 35,000 Americans found that 
approximately 95% of people believe in God (Pew Research Center, 2008).  The percentage of 
people who espouse a belief in a God varies widely across countries (Zuckerman, 2007, 2009) 
and even though there are hundreds of millions of non-believers wordwide (Zuckerman, 2007; 
Newport, 2011), they represent a minority.  The term “atheist” is generally used to describe 
individuals who, given the available evidence, conclude that there are no Gods or creators, and 
the term “agnostic” is used to describe people who are unsure, undecided, or apathetic about the 
existence or non-existence of a God or a creator (Zuckerman, 2009).  The focus in this paper is 
on people’s belief or disbelief in God (e.g., believers, atheists, & agnostics) and their perceived 
and actual anger levels.     
 Atheists are a minority group in the U.S.  Typically, overt discrimination or unjustifiable 
negative behavior toward minorities is not explicitly tolerated in many societies (e.g., in regards 
to race or gender).  However, discrimination against atheists appears to be somewhat acceptable.  
For example, atheists are distrusted (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011) and considered to be 
lacking in morality (Zuckerman, 2009).  More consequential, less than 50% of Americans state 
that they would vote for an atheist presidential candidate (Jones, 2007) and 48% of individuals in 
one sample said they would disapprove if their child chose to marry an atheist (Edgell, Gerteis, 
& Hartmann, 2006).  Another study found that people would discriminate against atheists in 
important medical treatments (Furnham, Meader, & McClelland, 1998).  
 Discrimination can be rationalized on the basis of the supposed undesirable stereotypes or 
generalized beliefs about a given group of people.  For example, the belief that obese people are 
lazy and lacking in personal responsibility may bolster the tendency to discriminate against them 
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(Puhl & Heur, 2010).  Stereotypes can also lead to a type of self-fulfilling prophecy that has been 
labeled “stereotype threat” (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999).  For example, the belief that 
women are worse at math compared to men can actually cause women to perform more poorly 
on math exams (Spencer et al., 1999).  Therefore, identifying and correcting inaccurate 
stereotypes could be a useful strategy in reducing the negative outcomes of stereotypes.  In this 
paper, we examine the prevalence and accuracy of an angry-atheist stereotype.  
One potential stereotype about atheists is that they are particularly angry individuals.  
Countless media reports, internet postings, interviewers, and authors have used the angry-atheist 
label (e.g., Adams, 2011; Gellman, 2006; Lurie, 2010; Shaha, 2010, Vegano, 2011).  A self-
proscribed atheist has even written a book that attempts to explain why atheists are so angry 
(Christina, 2012).  A general theme in these anecdotal examples is that atheists are particularly 
angry people, and that they challenge religion and believers in an angry and confrontational 
manner.  Advocates of a “New Atheist” movement (e.g., atheist groups and well known 
commentators like Richard Dawkins or Sam Harris) challenge religion and the existence of a 
creator in a passionate manner, and they do so in more public settings than the more underground 
conversations of atheists from the past.  Such public discussions may contribute to the general 
perception that, overall, atheists are exceptionally angry individuals.  On the basis of such 
confrontational case examples and media depictions, but also in part to justify discriminatory 
behavior, we hypothesized that atheists would be viewed as angrier than other individuals (which 
is a systematic focus of Studies 1-3 of our investigation). 
Researchers have examined stereotypes about atheists (e.g., Ehrlich & Van Tubergen, 
1971; Gervais et al., 2011) as well as relations between religiosity and mood (e.g., Diener, Tay, 
& Myers, 2011; Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Koenig & Larson, 2001; Shreve-Neiger & Edelstein, 
THE MYTH OF THE ANGRY ATHEIST                                                                                   5 
 
2004), but we are unaware of any work that has specifically examined stereotypes about anger 
and belief in God or the actual relationship between these variables.  Some stereotypes have a 
basis in reality.  Research shows some support for the “beauty is good” stereotype linking 
attractiveness to friendliness (Meier, Robinson, Carter, & Hinsz, 2010).  We suspect that the 
angry-atheist stereotype, if it exists and is robust, is unlikely to be a stereotype of this type.  
Media portrayals of the angry atheist almost surely focus on confirmatory cases and ignore cases 
that disconfirm the stereotype. As such, these confirmatory cases are unlikely to characterize the 
behaviors of the average non-believer.  One’s doubt about the existence of God is likely 
motivated by other considerations rather than anger or hostility.  Religion can be a touchy subject 
to both believers and non-believers, but touchiness in this context need not imply touchiness in 
others.  For all of these reasons, we doubted whether atheists would be angrier than believers (a 
focus of Studies 4-7 of our investigation). 
All told, then, we expected greater myth than reality to the angry-atheist stereotype.  The 
value of this work is both scientific and potentially societal.  Negative stereotypes fuel 
discriminatory behavior (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002) and misperceptions of anger 
can engender hostile behaviors on the part of perceivers (Orobio de Castro, Veerman, Koops, 
Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002), both of which are problematic outcomes.  By both documenting 
and disconfirming the angry-atheist stereotype, then, it is possible that our findings could 
contribute to a more civil discourse between believers and non-believers who are informed of 
such findings.  
Overview of Studies 
Studies 1-3 focus on the question of whether people ascribe higher levels of anger to 
atheists than to believers or people in general.  Studies 4-7 focus on the question of whether there 
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is in fact a relationship between people’s belief in God and their levels of trait and state anger.  
Both questions will be pursued in multiple ways with different types of designs for the sake of 
comprehensiveness. 
Study 1 
Study 1 sought to determine whether people perceive atheists to be angrier than theists 
(i.e., people who belief in a God).  We asked people to rate the average level of anger of both 
atheists and theists.  We hypothesized that people would rate atheists as angrier than theists.  
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 93 individuals (58 females; age M = 36.82 years; SD = 
12.82 years).  The self-reported race breakdown of participants was as follows: 87.10% 
Caucasian, 4.30% African-American, 4.30% Asian or Pacific Islander, 2.15% Hispanic, 1.10% 
American Indian or Alaskan Native, and 1.10% mixed race.  
 Materials and Procedure.  Participants were recruited from Amazon.com’s Mechanical 
Turk, which has been shown to be a valid way to collect online data (Paolacci, Chandler, & 
Ipeirotis, 2010).  The advantages of this recruitment procedure are diversity in age and 
geographical location.  Participants were asked two straightforward questions that examined their 
explicit beliefs about the anger of atheists and theists.  They were asked to rate the level of anger 
of the average atheist (“I think the average atheist - a person who does not believe in God - is”) 
and believer (“I think the average theist or believer - a person who believes in God - is”) using a 
7-point scale (1 = not at all angry; 7 = very angry).  In addition to the questions about atheists 
and believers, participants completed a number of questionnaires that were not relevant to the 
present study.   
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Results and Discussion 
Participant gender did not interact or modify the findings in any of the studies so we do 
not discuss it.  We used a paired-samples t-test to determine if the perceived level of anger 
differed for atheists and theists.  Atheists were perceived to be angrier (M = 3.48; SD = 1.49) 
than theists (M = 2.37; SD = 1.26), t(92) = 5.80, p < .001, d = 0.60.  Study 1 provided initial 
support for an angry-atheist stereotype in people’s explicit beliefs. 
Study 2 
 People are sometimes reluctant to explicitly (consciously and in self-reported terms) 
endorse negative beliefs about minority groups (Greenwald et al., 2002).  For this reason, it is 
useful to assess stereotypes based on group membership using implicit (possibly unconscious, 
performance-based) measures as well (Greenwald et al., 2002).  Implicit measures examine 
associations between concepts without directly or explicitly asking participants for such 
information with the goal of ascertaining an accurate picture of people’s beliefs about sensitive 
subjects such as racial attitudes (Fazio & Olson, 2003).  Following this literature, Study 2 sought 
to examine if, and the extent to which, the angry-atheist stereotype characterizes implicit 
associations in addition to self-reported beliefs (i.e., the results of Study 1).  To examine this 
question, we used the implicit association test (IAT), which has been used in hundreds of studies 
and has displayed admirable levels of predictive validity (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & 
Banaji, 2009).  We hypothesized that participants would display implicit associations consistent 
with the angry-atheist stereotype. 
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 111 North Dakota State University undergraduates (52 
females; age M = 19.38 years; SD = 1.88 years).  The original sample included 115 participants, 
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but 4 participants were dropped because of incomplete data or task errors.  The self-reported race 
breakdown of participants was as follows: 73.00% Caucasian, 13.50% African-American, 8.10% 
Asian or Pacific Islander, 1.80% Hispanic, 1.80% American Indian or Alaskan Native, 0.90% 
Creole, and 0.90% non-report.  
 Materials and Procedure.  Participants completed an IAT and answered demographic 
questions in private rooms with computers.  The IAT is used to examine associations among 
concepts in an indirect manner (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  Our version of the 
IAT required participants to categorize randomly presented words in terms of four categories: 
atheist, believer, angry, and calm.  We used the word “atheist” for the atheist category and the 
word “believer” for the believer category as these words directly targeted the categories of 
interest and there are few synonyms.  With respect to the angry versus calm distinction, five 
angry (angry, annoyed, bitter, hostile, & irritable) and five calm (calm, easygoing, peaceful, 
relaxed, & restful) words were presented in different trials.  The latter comparison category was 
used because calmness is antithetical to anger (Berkowitz, 1993).  
 Across numerous trials, participants were asked to categorize a randomly presented word 
quickly and accurately one at a time.  Category names appeared on the upper left and right of a 
screen.  Individuals pressed the “q” key of the keyboard if the word belonged to the category (or 
categories) on the left and the “p” key of the keyboard if the word belonged to the category (or 
categories) on the right.  Incorrect categorizations (e.g., categorizing the word “hostile” as a 
“calm” word instead of an “angry” word) were followed by the word INCORRECT in red font 
for 1,500 milli-seconds (ms) or 1.50 seconds.  Correct categorizations were followed by a 150 
ms blank screen until the next word appeared.  
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 The IAT had five blocks; three of them were practice blocks.  The critical comparison 
was between block 3, which included the combined compatible categories of “believer-calm” 
and “atheist-angry”, and block 5, which included the combined incompatible categories of 
“believer-angry” and “atheist-calm”.  In these blocks, two categories were mapped onto one 
response button.  For example, in block 3, participants pressed the “q” key if the word presented 
on any given trial was “believer” or had a calm meaning (e.g., peaceful), but they pressed the “p” 
key if the word presented on any given trial was “atheist” or had an angry meaning (e.g., 
annoyed).  In block 5, participants pressed the “q” key if the word presented on any given trial 
was “atheist” or had a calm meaning, but they pressed the “p” key if the word presented on any 
given trial was “believer” or had an angry meaning.  The purpose of these blocks was to 
determine if participants were faster when atheist-angry and believer-calm were paired (block 3) 
compared to when atheist-calm and believer-angry are paired (block 5).  In the IAT, blocks with 
faster average categorizations times are a sign of associations that are formed in memory. 
Participants completed 60 trials in each of these blocks.   
 We administered the compatible block involving atheist-angry and believer-calm before 
the incompatible block involving atheist-calm and believer-angry.  A meta-analysis has 
established that variations in the order of compatible and incompatible blocks minimally 
influence the size of implicit associations as determined by the IAT (Nosek, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2005).   
Results and Discussion 
 Quantification procedures were consistent with the original IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998).  
We deleted inaccurate trials (7.2% of trials) and replaced trials faster than 300 ms or slower than 
3,000 ms with these actual values.  In other words, all trials slower than 300 ms were recoded to 
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300 ms and all trials faster than 3,000 ms were recoded to 3,000 ms.  A log-transformation was 
then performed to reduce the positive skew inherent to reaction-time data.  Analyses were 
performed on log-transformed values, but results are reported in terms of ms for ease of 
interpretation.  We used a paired-samples t-test to examine categorization times by block type.  
Participants were much faster categorizing words in the atheist-angry/believer-calm block (M = 
742 ms; SD = 106 ms) than in the atheist-calm/believer-angry block (M = 984 ms; SD = 170 ms), 
t(110) = 19.61, p < .001, d = 1.86.  The effect size for this result was large suggesting that the 
angry-atheist stereotype appears robust in terms of implicit associations.   
Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence for a stereotype in which atheists were viewed as 
angrier compared to believers.  This conclusion would be bolstered if replicated with a different 
block order, but it is unlikely that a different result would have been found given prior results 
(Greenwald et al., 1998; Nosek et al. 2005).  Nonetheless, the invariant block order chosen could 
be viewed as a limitation of Study 2 or at least an area for future investigation.  All told, then, 
people appear to associate atheism with anger in terms of implicit associations.   
Study 3 
In Study 3, we sought to replicate and extend the results from Studies 1 and 2 in a 
number of ways.  First, in order to ensure that the results from Studies 1 and 2 were reliable and 
generalizable, we collected data from a nationally representative sample of participants from the 
U.S. who were recruited by the survey company Qualtrics.  Second, the comparison group for 
Studies 1 and 2 was believers or theists.  Although the vast majority of Americans are in fact 
believers in God (Pew Research Center, 2008), it is possible that this label rendered anger 
judgments (or implicit associations involving anger) lower than they otherwise might be.  
Accordingly, the control target group for Study 3 was “people in general”.  We hypothesized that 
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atheists would be rated as angrier than people in general, thus confirming a particular sort of link 
between perceptions of atheists and the emotion of anger. 
Third, we wanted to establish that ascriptions of anger to atheists do not occur simply 
because of the minority status of this group.  To make this point, Study 3 included another 
minority target group - gay and lesbian individuals - for comparison purposes.  This comparison 
group is similar in size and familiarity to the atheist group and has been used effectively in 
previous stereotype research (e.g., Gervais et al., 2011).  We hypothesized that participants 
would perceive atheists to be angrier than gay and lesbian individuals, which are results that 
would support the specificity of the angry-atheist stereotype.  Study 3 also assessed participants’ 
own beliefs in God as a potential moderating factor. 
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 196 individuals (99 females; age M = 45.09 years; SD = 
16.28 years). The self-reported race breakdown of participants was as follows: 73.50% 
Caucasian, 10.20% African-American, 9.20% Hispanic, 6.60% Asian or Pacific Islander, and 
0.50% no answer.  As an indicator of the national scope of the data collection effort, responses 
were obtained from participants in 40 different states.  
 Materials and Procedure.  The participants completed a number of questionnaires, 
many of which were not relevant to the present study.  The participants were asked three 
questions that examined their explicit beliefs about the anger of atheists, people in general, and 
gay and lesbian individuals (1 = not at all angry; 7 = extremely angry).  They later also 
completed a single-item belief in God scale.  They were asked to answer this question: I believe 
God exists (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = neither disagree nor agree; 9 = strongly agree).  Single-
item continuous belief in God measures like this one are frequently used in the religiosity 
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literature to assess the extent to which people believe in God (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012a; 
Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). 
Results and Discussion 
The mean of the single-item belief in God measure was 7.32 (SD = 2.35).  We examined 
anger perceptions by group (i.e., atheists, people in general, and gay and lesbian individuals) and 
belief in God (z-scored) using a General Linear Model analysis.  The main effect of belief in God 
was not significant, F(1, 194) = 3.01, p = .08.  Both the main effect of group, F(2, 388) = 24.40, 
p < .001, partial eta squared = .11, and the interaction between group and belief in God, F(2, 
388) = 11.96, p < .001, partial eta squared = .06, were significant.  We ran multiple paired-
samples t-tests in order to examine the target group main effect.  Participants rated atheists as 
angrier (M = 4.35; SD = 1.55) than people in general (M = 3.95; SD = 1.31), t(195) = 3.16, p = 
.002, d = 0.23, and gay and lesbian individuals (M = 3.51; SD = 1.55), t(195) = 7.01, p < .001, d 
= 0.51.  Gay and lesbian individuals were perceived to be less angry than people in general, 
t(195) = 3.50, p = .001, d = 0.25, which is interesting, but not particularly relevant to the 
predictions in the current study. 
 The procedures of Aiken and West (1991) were used to understand the significant 
interaction.  As shown in Figure 1, participants scoring high (+1 SD) in belief in God rated 
atheists as angrier than people in general, F(1, 194) = 33.59, p < .001, partial eta squared = .15, 
and the gay and lesbian target group, F(1, 194) = 36.14, p < .001, partial eta squared = .16, with 
no difference between the latter two groups, F < 1.  The pattern differed somewhat for those 
participants scoring low (-1 SD) in belief in God.  At this low level of belief, estimated means 
did not differ for the atheist and people in general target groups, F < 1.20, though the gay and 
lesbian target group was perceived to be less angry than atheists, F(1, 194) = 16.27, p < .001, 
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partial eta squared = .08, and people in general, F(1, 194) = 23.32, p < .001, partial eta squared = 
.11. 
As might be expected, then, the tendency to perceive atheists as angrier than people in 
general was more pronounced at higher levels of belief in God.  Irrespective of belief in God, 
though, atheists were perceived to be angrier than both people in general and a comparison 
minority group, thereby replicating and extending the results of Studies 1 and 2.  The latter result 
is an important one in suggesting that there is some specificity to the angry-atheist stereotype, 
though other target group comparisons might be used in the future. 
Study 4 
 Studies 1-3 establish the existence of an angry-atheist stereotype.  In Studies 4-7, we 
examined whether this stereotype is accurate.  Studies 4-7 could quite conceivably involve null 
effects.  Although any particular null effect might be questioned, we took steps to ensure that 
appropriate conclusions could be drawn.  Convergence across studies was emphasized, and 
beliefs in God and experiences of anger were assessed in multiple ways.  In addition, the sample 
sizes were such that the statistical power was in the range of approximately .70 to .80, which is 
sufficient to detect a medium effect.  Therefore, the power of these studies was adequate (Aron, 
Aron, & Coups, 2009; Cohen, 1992). 
 Study 4 offers perhaps the strongest test of the angry-atheist hypothesis because 
participants were asked to categorize their religious affiliation (i.e., one’s self identification of 
being an atheist, Christian, etc.).  Few individuals self-identify as atheists in a strict sense of the 
term (Pew Research Center, 2008).  Accordingly, a large sample size was collected to identify 
such individuals.  Participants completed a trait anger scale and categorized their religious 
affiliation.  Three different results are possible: (1) atheists score higher in trait anger than 
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believers, (2) atheists score lower in trait anger than believers, (3) or atheists do not differ in trait 
anger compared to believers.    
Method 
 Participants.  Over several semesters from 2007 to 2012, we recruited 1,009 Gettysburg 
College undergraduates (612 females; age M = 18.94; SD = 2.03 years).  The self-reported race 
breakdown of participants was as follows: 89.10% Caucasian, 3.80% African-American, 3.20% 
Asian or Pacific Islander, 2.20% Hispanic, .20 % American Indian or Alaskan Native, and 1.60% 
other or a race that was not listed.  
 Materials and Procedure.  Participants were asked to list their religious affiliation as a 
category (e.g., atheist, Christian, or Jewish).  Participants also reported on their levels of anger in 
relation to the commonly used Buss-Perry Trait Anger Scale (Buss & Perry, 1992).  This scale 
taps trait anger or the extent to which individuals become angry across situations and contexts; it 
measures anger in terms of a personality trait.  The scale consists of seven items (e.g., “I have 
trouble controlling my temper”) rated along a 5-point continuum (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = 
strongly agree).  We averaged the items to form a measure of trait anger (α = .78; M = 2.20; SD = 
0.68).  The participants completed other questionnaires and tasks not related to the current 
hypothesis.  
Results and Discussion 
 Seventy participants classified themselves as atheists and 757 participants classified 
themselves as believers or theists (a Christian or Jewish faith).  The remaining 182 participants 
categorized themselves as something other than an atheist or theist (e.g., a Hindu or they chose 
an other category).  We used a one-way ANOVA to examine whether atheists had higher trait 
anger than theists.  We did not find an effect of religious category, F(1, 825) = 0.12, p = .73; the 
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trait anger means of the atheists (M = 2.23; SD = 0.76) and theists (M = 2.20; SD = 0.68) were 
similar.  These results were nearly identical when we compared atheists to everyone else in the 
sample, F(1, 1007) = 0.13, p = .72; the trait anger means of the atheists (M = 2.23; SD = 0.76) 
and everyone else (M = 2.20; SD = 0.68) were similar.   
 We next examined the equivalency of the trait anger means between atheists and 
believers and atheists and everyone else using the equivalency between means testing procedures 
of Rogers, Howard, and Vessey (1993).  We found that the differences between the atheist and 
believer groups and the atheist and everyone else groups were within 10% of the smaller mean 
(approximately .22) in each case, ps < .05.  In other words, the means were equivalent.  Both 
ANOVA and equivalency testing procedures revealed that, when defined in a strictly categorical 
sense, atheists do not appear to be angrier than other individuals.      
Study 5 
 Study 4 revealed that atheists were not higher in trait anger than believers in God.  Even 
though the study was adequately powered, additional data are warranted given that null relations 
were obtained.  For power-related considerations, and because the results could be different, 
more continuous measures of belief in God were used in Studies 5-7.  In Study 5, participants 
completed two measures of belief in God and two measures of trait anger.  The results of Study 4 
led us to believe that we would not find a significant relationship between belief in God and trait 
anger.     
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 89 Gettysburg College undergraduates (49 females; age 
M = 18.67 years; SD = 2.52 years).  The self-reported race breakdown of participants was as 
follows: 92.10% Caucasian, 2.20% African-American, 2.20% Asian or Pacific Islander, 1.10% 
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Hispanic, and 2.20% other or a race that was not listed.  We also collected a categorical measure 
of religiosity.  The breakdown of participants’ categorical religiosity was as follows: 66.30% 
Christian, 7.90% atheist, 6.70% agnostic, 5.60% Jewish, and 13.50% other or a category that was 
not listed.  
 Materials and Procedure.  Participants completed tasks and questionnaires (many of 
which were not relevant to the present studies) on a computer.  Participants completed four trait 
scales relevant to the present study.  To assess belief in God, participants completed the Nearness 
to God Scale (Gorsuch & Smith, 1983), which has six items rated on a 4-point continuum (1 = 
strong disagreement; 4 = strong agreement).  The items were averaged to form a belief in God 
score (α = .93; M = 2.62; SD = 0.90).  Although the scale is labeled Nearness to God, the items 
tap belief in God (“God is very real to me”, “Because of his presence, we can know that God 
exists”).  Indeed, Toburen and Meier (2010) found that self-identified theists scored much higher 
on this scale than self-identified atheists (d = 1.30).  Nonetheless, we also used the face-valid and 
more direct belief in God measure from Study 3: “I believe God exists” (1 = strongly disagree; 9 
= strongly agree; M = 5.94; SD = 2.77). 
 To measure anger, participants completed the Buss-Perry Trait Anger Scale (Buss & 
Perry, 1992) used in Study 4 as well as the commonly used Spielberger Trait Anger scale 
(Spielberger, 1988), which consists of 10 items (e.g., “I have a fiery temper”) rated along a 4-
point continuum (1 = almost never; 4 = almost always).  The items were averaged to form two 
scores, Buss-Perry scale (α = .79; M = 2.11; SD = 0.62); Spielberger scale (α = .82; M = 1.88; SD 
= 0.47). 
Results and Discussion 
 We computed Pearson correlations to determine the direction and strength of relations 
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between belief in God and trait anger.  As shown in Table 1, neither belief in God measure was 
significantly related to either trait anger measure.  Not only were these correlations non-
significant, but they tended to be in the opposite direction of the angry-atheist stereotype.  Study 
5 provides converging validity for the idea that the angry-atheist stereotype does not appear to be 
accurate.   
Study 6 
 We wanted to substantiate the findings of Study 5 using a more generalizable sample of 
individuals in the U.S.  Study 5 consisted of college undergraduates.  Such individuals, typically 
away from their parents for the first time, are likely to question prior religious beliefs (Brown & 
Lowe, 1951).  Accordingly, it was deemed important to examine relations between belief in God 
and trait anger among an older group of individuals.  Participants from Amazon.com’s 
Mechanical Turk completed the same questionnaires from Study 5.  We did not expect to find 
significant relationships between belief in God and anger.  
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 108 individuals (73 females; age M = 34.37 years; SD = 
13.03 years) who lived in 28 different U.S. states.  The self-reported race breakdown of 
participants was as follows: 79.60% Caucasian, 13.90% Asian or Pacific Islander, 4.60% 
Hispanic, and 1.90% African-American.  We also collected a categorical measure of religiosity. 
The breakdown of participants’ categorical religiosity was as follows: 63.00% Christian, 16.70% 
agnostic, 8.30% atheist, 1.90% Jewish, 1.90% Buddhist, 0.90% Hindu, and 7.40% other or a 
category that was not listed.  
Materials and Procedure.  The participants completed the same scales administered in 
Study 5 as well as other questionnaires not relevant to this study.  They completed the Nearness 
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to God (α = .97; M = 2.71; SD = 1.12), direct belief in God (M = 6.27; SD = 3.05), Spielberger (α 
= .87; M = 1.77; SD = 0.53), and Buss-Perry (α = .88; M = 2.42; SD = 0.82) scales.  
Results and Discussion 
 In this more diverse sample in terms of age and location, the results were similar to Study 
5.  As shown in Table 1, neither belief in God measure significantly correlated with either 
measure of trait anger.  However, the two belief in God measures were strongly correlated as 
were the two trait anger measures, which coincides with the results of Study 5.  Accordingly, 
variations in belief in God appear non-predictive of trait anger among an older sample. 
Study 7 
 Studies 4-6 examined belief in God and trait anger.  People higher in trait anger have 
more experiences of state or momentary anger as well (Deffenbacher, 1992).  State anger, 
though, is particularly apparent in aversive or provoking contexts (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 
2004).  In order to provide additional converging validity to Studies 4-6, we assessed belief in 
God and state anger following an anger induction in Study 7.  We hypothesized that state anger 
would be higher following an anger-induction manipulation, but we did not expect belief in God 
to have an influence on this effect.  
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 71 Gettysburg College undergraduates (43 females; age 
M = 18.72 years; SD = 1.09 years).  The original sample included 76 participants, but 5 
participants were dropped because of incomplete data or because they did not complete the task 
properly.  The self-reported race breakdown of participants was as follows: 94.40% Caucasian, 
4.20% African-American, and 1.40% American Indian or Alaskan Native.  We also collected a 
categorical measure of religiosity. The breakdown of participants’ categorical religiosity was as 
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follows: 66.20% Christian, 9.90% atheist, 8.50% agnostic, 7.00% Jewish, and 8.50% other or a 
category that was not listed. 
 Materials and Procedure.  Belief in God was assessed in terms of the Nearness to God 
Scale (α = .94; M = 2.74; SD = 0.95), which correlated strongly with the direct belief in God 
measure in Studies 5 and 6.  Participants also completed a state anger scale after the 
manipulation.  They rated their current feelings across six items (e.g., angry, hostile) of the 
PANAS-X State Anger Scale (Watson & Clark, 1994) using an 11-point response scale (0 = not 
at all; 10 = extremely).  We averaged across these markers to quantify state anger (α = .81; M = 
1.57; SD = 1.54).   
 The emotion induction literature has shown that autobiographical writing manipulations 
are effective in targeting an emotional state of interest (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Moons & 
Mackie, 2007) and we, therefore, used such a manipulation.  By random assignment, individuals 
were asked to spend 6 minutes writing about a previous event that had made them extremely 
angry (the anger induction condition) or about their activities during the previous day (the 
control condition).  Subsequently, individuals reported on their momentary anger using the 
PANAS-X scales.  They also completed the Nearness to God scale.   
Results and Discussion 
 A General Linear Model analysis was conducted with state anger as the dependent 
variable and the anger induction and z-scored belief in God as the independent variables.  As 
expected, participants in the anger condition reported more state anger (M = 2.00; SD = 1.79) 
than participants in the control condition (M = 1.14; SD = 1.09), F(1, 67) = 5.81, p = .019, partial 
eta squared = .08.  This effect reveals that the anger manipulation was effective.  The main effect 
for belief in God was not significant, F(1, 67) = 1.95, p = .17 (the predicted means were in the 
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opposite direction of the angry-atheist stereotype).  Importantly, belief in God did not moderate 
or buffer the impact of the anger manipulation, F < 1.  For the sake of complete reporting, Figure 
2 displays estimated means (Aiken & West, 1991) as a function of condition and low (-1 SD) 
versus high (+1 SD) levels of beliefs in God.  Accordingly, it appears equally easy to induce 
anger among individuals low versus high in belief in God.  
General Discussion 
 Our studies revealed that people believe that atheists are angrier than believers, people in 
general, and another minority group of comparable size.  Yet, we did not find any evidence to 
suggest that atheists – or those people believing in God to a lesser extent – are particularly angry 
individuals.  Below, we discuss implications, outline some future directions of research, and 
address potential limitations. 
Implications and Future Considerations 
First and foremost, our results suggest that the idea of the angry-atheist is a myth.  
Although people espouse the view that atheists are angry, and although such associations are 
embedded at an implicit level of cognition, the idea simply does not appear to be true.  For this 
reason, we would encourage people to challenge this idea when expressed by communication 
partners or when encountered in popular media sources.  It is a misperception that should be 
corrected rather than endorsed. 
Indeed, it is important to correct negative stereotypes that are not true because they can 
have unfortunate consequences.  For example, research has shown that perceiving other people 
as angry can make us hostile and set the stage for conflicts that need not happen (Berkowitz, 
2012; Orobio de Castro et al., 2002).  Such conflicts may be especially likely with atheists 
because this group appears to be stigmatized in some unique ways (Gervais et al., 2011; Gervais 
THE MYTH OF THE ANGRY ATHEIST                                                                                   21 
 
& Norenzayan, 2012b) and because society does not seem to censure the disparagement of 
atheists in the same way that it might censure the disparagement of other minorities.  Stereotypes 
are detrimental to stigmatized groups because they create expectations about how people should 
treat out-group individuals (Bahns & Branscombe, 2010).  Future research should focus on 
whether the angry-atheist stereotype actually drives discriminatory behavior.  For example, does 
an angry-atheist perception correlate with a tendency to withhold rights from atheists?  Or, 
perhaps, does an angry-atheist perception lead others to start arguments with atheists leading to 
an induced confirmation of the stereotype?  In sum, the angry-atheist perception might partially 
drive discriminatory behavior against atheists.  Studies that assess both variables will be useful in 
examining this idea.    
 Our studies were not designed to identify the factors that drive an angry-atheist 
stereotype.  Indeed, our research question was purposely simple: does the angry-atheist 
stereotype exist and to what extent is it accurate?  However, we can speculate on some potential 
causes.  One potential cause relates to passionate atheists who discuss religion in public settings.  
These individuals are typically open, forceful, and fervent about their beliefs.  Such discussions 
about religion and God go against what most Americans believe.  These portrayals could drive 
people’s beliefs that atheists are angry.  Furthermore, media brings to mind this stereotype when 
they use the term “angry atheist” to describe this passionate communication style.    
Another potential cause relates to perceivers potentially projecting their own anger onto 
atheists.  Religion is a major source of meaning and comfort to a large number of Americans 
(Pew Research Center, 2008).  Atheists may be perceived to threaten this source of meaning, 
thereby triggering anger and the defensive sorts of processes identified by existential 
psychologists (e.g., Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2000).  Research has indeed shown 
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that people can project anger onto other individuals.  For example, Schimel, Greenberg, and 
Martens (2003) found that participants who were told that they scored high versus low on a 
measure of anger subsequently rated a hypothetical person as higher in anger.  Other work has 
shown that participants who underwent an angry versus a sad or neutral mood induction were 
more likely to use stereotypes when making judgments about a hypothetical individual 
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994).  Furthermore, prominent models of aggression 
suggest that experiencing provocation and anger can bias people into perceiving subsequent 
events in a hostile manner (Berkowitz, 2012; Meier & Wilkowski, 2013).  Future work should 
examine if anger in perceivers is related to the tendency to engage in the angry-atheist 
stereotype.  For example, researchers could examine the extent to which state or trait anger 
predicts the tendency to use the angry-atheist stereotype.    
 It is also possible that there is a type of “focalism” to the angry-atheist stereotype and to 
why it is not correct.  Atheists are a small minority and many people may have few interactions 
with them (Zuckerman, 2007).  Research suggests that it is precisely under such conditions that 
stereotypes can thrive even if incorrect (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003).  That is, they 
thrive when people have preconceived ideas about a group of people that are not updated in the 
context of “individuating” information concerning particular people from that group.  The same 
principles can explain why negative stereotypes could persist even with relatively friendly 
encounters because we are often unaware of the religious beliefs of the people with whom we 
interact.  Such a tendency can be magnified considering that people tend to seek information that 
confirms rather than disconfirms their initial beliefs (Nickerson, 1998).   
 We assessed trait anger because trait anger encompasses the most general anger-related 
tendencies of individuals (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010).  We also assessed state anger in 
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relation to prototypical elicitors of it (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  However, we cannot conclude 
that there will never be differences in anger between believers and non-believers.  Indeed, it 
would be interesting to examine anger in the context of religious settings or disagreements.  On 
the one hand, one might predict that, in these contexts at least, atheists might experience anger 
more intensely in reaction to what they perceive to be an erroneous belief system.  On the other 
hand, though, there are reasons for thinking that belief in God can serve a defensive function and 
that, for this reason, believers might become more angry if they think that their beliefs are being 
challenged (Solomon et al., 2000).  Creative research designs would be needed to examine this 
more specific research question, though the results would have value in extending the present 
analysis in a more nuanced fashion. 
Limitations 
 Our studies included some limitations that are worth discussing.  First, larger sample 
sizes can be advocated for some purposes at least.  In more particular terms, the statistical power 
in Study 7 was lower than the other studies and would benefit from a larger sample size (though 
note that the direction of the believer/non-believer difference was counter to the angry-atheist 
stereotype).  Second, some of the dependent measures involved one item.  Although single-item 
measures of religious orientation are often used, they may not be the most reliable ones.  Third, 
with the exception of Study 2, all of our dependent measures were self-reported in nature.  We 
do regard this reliance on self-report as a limitation and would use behavioral paradigms, 
observer reports, or peer reports in extensions of the present work.  Fourth, we briefly remind the 
reader that block order was not counterbalanced in Study 2.  Doing so could be useful in 
supporting the results of Study 2 (though see Nosek et al., 2003).  In the context of these 
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limitations, we emphasize the convergence of the conclusions across multiple studies using 
multiple methods and sample types. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 We examined the prevalence and accuracy of an angry-atheist stereotype in seven 
studies.  We found that people believe atheists are angrier than believers, people in general, and 
another minority group, both explicitly and implicitly.  However, none of our studies supported 
the idea that atheists are angrier than other individuals.  Our work, in sum, suggests that the 
angry-atheist stereotype exists, but that it does not match reality.  Dissemination of the present 
results may be useful in correcting misperceptions while averting potential unwarranted and 
harmful consequences.   
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Table 1 
 
Correlations among Variables, Study 5 (Above the Diagonal) and Study 6 (Below the Diagonal) 
 
Nearness to 
God 
Direct God 
Belief 
Buss-Perry 
Trait Anger 
Spielberger 
Trait Anger 
Nearness to God -    .62* .06  .13 
Direct God Belief    .93* - .01 -.01 
Buss-Perry Trait Anger -.04 -.05 -    .71* 
Spielberger Trait Anger -.07 -.08 .77* - 
 
* = p < .01 
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Figure 1. 
Predicted Perceived Anger of Atheists, People in General, and Gay and Lesbian Individuals by 
Belief in God, Study 3 
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Figure 2. 
Predicted State Anger by Belief in God and the Anger Manipulation Condition, Study 7 
 
